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INTERNATIONAL
The Food Crisis in Sub-Saharan 
Africa
By Wilfred L. David
D uring the past several years world attention has become riveted to the stark and startling pictures portray­
ing the ravages of famine and drought in 
Ethiopia and other countries in Sub-Sa­
haran Africa. Many have died, and many 
more have been threatened by poverty, 
disease, and malnutrition.
The rains have now fallen in many areas, 
and some countries now report green fields 
and bumper harvests. While this may be a 
visible sign of recovery, the fundamental 
problem of food insecurity still remains. 
New approaches to development are 
needed to effectively combat the inevitable 
disasters wrought by nature, by man, and a 
generalized African penury.
The attainment of “food security” is a 
primary objective of development. Food 
security connotes a situation in which all 
people at all times have access to enough 
food for an active and healthy life. By 
contrast, “food insecurity” means a lack of 
access to enough food. It has both tempo­
rary and chronic dimensions. In the former 
case, people’s access to food may decline in 
the short run due to an instability in food 
production, escalating food prices, periodic 
unemployment, and so on. Famine repre­
sents the worst form of this temporary food 
insecurity.
Chronic food insecurity is reflected in 
continuously inadequate diets caused by the 
inability to acquire enough food. This af­
fects people who persistently lack the 
ability either to grow their own food or to 
buy it. It may manifest itself in a variety of 
ways, including: chronic malnutrition, de­
clining food production per capita, environ­
mental damage (desertification, deforesta­
tion), growing reliance on imports of food 
staples, rising food aid requirements, in­
creasing foreign debt, and overall economic 
stagnation and decline.
An inordinate degree of attention has 
been focused on the short-term crises and











temporary food insecurity, e.g., the late 
1960s famine in Biafra (Nigeria) due to a 
civil war, the calamities that befell the 
Sahelian countries and Ethiopia between 
1968 and 1972, and the “Great Famine” of 
1984-1986.
However, these examples have become 
poignant reminders of the fact that huge 
areas of the African continent are famine- 
prone, and that in practically all countries 
severe and recurrent food shortages may 
have become endemic. Elements of the 
longer term crisis have been less obvious to 
the casual observer. For more than two 
decades, gradual changes in economic and 
ecological relationships have continuously 
threatened the stability and existence of 
societies. With the imponderable strains 
put on national and local food systems, 
many countries have increasingly lost the 
ability to improve the living standards of the 
masses of the population.
The U.N. Food and Agricultural Organi­
zation (FAO) has reported that about 214 
million people living in 24 countries in Sub- 
Saharan Africa now experience severe 
forms of food insecurity. More than 150 
million people in these countries face en­
ergy-deficient diets, i.e., they are not con­
suming enough calories for an active work­
ing life. Of these, about 90 million or 25 
percent of the population do not get enough 
calories to prevent stunted growth and 
other health risks. These estimates do not 
include the long-term effects of malnutri­
tion, such as increased susceptibility to 
crippling and fatal disease, brain damage, 
retardation, and other forms of deformity.
Therefore, there is a need to explore 
some of the deeper causes of food inse­
curity in Sub-Saharan Africa, the policy 
changes required, and the prospects for 
solving the crisis that these policies offer.
The underlying problems are complex, 
and coming to grips with them requires a 
multifaceted political economy approach. 
Within the bounds of such a broad struc­
tural approach, the centrality of agriculture 
in improving food security and raising the 
basic standard of living should be recog­
nized.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the Af­
rican economy, and provides the principal 
means through which the continent partici­
pates in the world economy. However, Sub- 
Saharan Africa is the only region in the 
world that today grows less food than it did 
in the 1960s.
Causes of the Food Crisis
The causes of the food crisis include a 
multiplicity of internal and external factors 
that continue to affect the structure and 
performance of the agricultural sector in 
particular, and the behavior of the overall 
economic system and society. In general, 
these include: poverty; international eco­
nomic and political processes; global reces­
sion; serious natural, economic, and politi­
cal disasters; population growth; national 
politics and government policies; social 
relations; and the technical possibilities 
facing the agricultural sector.
Indeed, poverty remains the major cause 
of hunger, famine, and other forms of food 
insecurity. Rarely do middle class and 
wealthy people go hungry in countries 
experiencing drought, famine, or food 
shortages. Food is usually available to the 
monied class. It is the poor who go hungry, 
who even in normal times tend to exist at 
the margins of national economies.
The poor in Sub-Saharan Africa have 
average incomes of just above $200 per 
year, and live predominantly in rural areas. 
Very little has been done to enhance the 
socioeconomic conditions and life chances 
of these rural masses, who constitute 80-90 
percent of the continent’s population. By 
and large, they subsist on uneconomically 
small holdings or as landless laborers. The 
typical rural dweller remains a citizen in 
name only; he/she is neglected and/or 
forgotten, especially in the distribution of
the national dividend to which he/she is also 
a contributor.
In every known society, especially in 
market-oriented economies based on pri­
vate ownership, how much food people can 
command depends on (a) ownership rights, 
i.e., what they own, and (b) their exchange 
entitlements, i.e., what they can get in 
exchange for what they own through trade, 
production, or both.1 In such a situation, 
people can face starvation and other forms 
of food insecurity for either of two reasons.
On the one hand, their ownership rights 
may collapse. Such rights define the system 
of income and asset distribution and repre­
sent rules about who ought to get what 
under what circumstances.2 They are cre­
ated in political practice, and are embodied 
in beliefs and rules as reflected in legal and 
economic processes, e.g., land tenure rules, 
notions about family obligations, wage 
rates, rules about market transactions, and 
so on. They are specific to particular 
historical circumstances facing a given 
country. In the African context, such rules 
have increasingly discriminated against 
peasant farmers.
On the other hand, exchange entitle­
ments may collapse, e.g., through people 
becoming unemployed. In the typical case, 
this is accompanied by a lack of income to 
purchase food, a general fall in the relative 
price of goods, and an increase in food 
prices. Thus, despite the total availability of 
food in any particular area, people still may 
go hungry because they cannot establish 
their “entitlement” to the food they need. 
When there is a general shortage, food 
price, relative to other goods, is raised, 
making affordability difficult for poor peo­
ple. However, starvation can occur with 
little or no rise in food prices. In the great 
Ethiopian famines of the 1970s and 1980s, 
hundreds of thousands died without any 
sustained rise in food prices.
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African Agriculture and the Global 
Political Economy
There is considerable discussion of the 
impact of external factors and relationships 
on African agriculture, and whether Africa 
suffers from too much or too little integra­
tion into the world capitalist economy. The 
conventional wisdom is that current food 
shortages and economic dependency have 
their historical roots in the continent’s 
incorporation into the world capitalist econ­
omy.
Before colonialism, agriculture was the 
primary economic activity in Africa. Rela­
tively sophisticated indigenous techniques 
had evolved — techniques that were suited 
to the needs of the people and their fragile 
ecosystems, and that helped them to cope 
with cyclical droughts and crop failures due 
to other causes. Adequate food security and 
self-reliance were common before Euro­
pean colonization. Effective methods had 
been developed for storage of food sur­
pluses, and complex patterns of trade had 
evolved around food availability. Within the 
existing system, population, resources, and 
technology were linked, and African so­
cieties shaped their agrarian institutions 
accordingly.
Colonialism introduces a system for ex­
tracting wealth from the continent. Agri­
cultural products and raw materials became 
an integral part of this wealth. Colonial 
powers encouraged forms of production 
that met their own needs and tastes, not the 
needs of the African people. Colonial gov­
ernments mandated that cash crops be 
planted for export, such as sugar, coffee, 
sisal, cotton, and tobacco, which displaced 
the production of food for local consump­
tion.
Land with the greatest fertility and 
agricultural potential was allocated to the 
production of cash crops for export. As a 
result, food production for local consump­
tion has had to rely increasingly on new 
cultivation in marginal rainfall zones and 
areas less suitable for farming. The histor­
ical process rendered food production more 
precarious and initiated the deterioration of 
these more fragile ecosystems.
Transportation networks were designed 
to facilitate the flow of export crops and 
other material goods between Africa and 
Europe, and not to facilitate the broad- 
based development of Africa.
The structural forms of dependency 
initiated during the colonial period have 
been heightened in post-colonial Africa. 
The cash crop system remains a reality
today in much of Africa, and agricultural 
exports are the primary source of foreign 
currency earnings. For example, Ethiopia, 
a country that has suffered the severest 
shortages of food, continues to grow coffee 
for export to industrialized nations and 
vegetables for consumption in Europe.
Successive world recessions have driven 
down the prices of export crops in world 
markets. At the same time, there have been 
asymmetric increases in the prices which 
Africa has had to pay for essential imports
Colonialism introduced a 
system for extracting 
wealth from the continent. 
Agricultural products and 
raw materials became an 
integral part of this 
wealth.
of consumer, intermediate, and capital 
goods, especially farm and transport ma­
chinery.
The Report of the International Con­
ference on African Economic Recovery, 
organized by the UN Economic Commis­
sion for Africa in June, 1987, drew attention 
to the fact that the prices of Africa’s 
principal commodity exports plummeted to 
their lowest level in 30 years. Total export 
receipts fell by $19 billion, from $65 billion 
in 1985 to $46 billion in 1987. Meanwhile, 
the prices of imported manufactured goods 
increased by 20 percent. According to the 
World Bank, this resulted in a 1986 deterio­
ration, in the terms of trade, of about 32 
percent. Needless to say, such a blow would 
be hard enough to bear even for the richest 
countries.
The situation also has been compounded 
by Africa’s severe debt problem. The UN 
Economic Commission for Africa has esti­
mated that the total foreign debt of Africa 
may have reached $200 billion.
A particularly disturbing aspect of the 
debt situation is that countries have to 
borrow more and more to pay off old loans. 
The World Bank has reported that the 17
most “debt-distressed” low-income African 
countries face scheduled debt-service pay­
ments in 1988-90 three times higher than 
they were able to pay in 1985 (from $2.3 
billion to $6.9 billion annually).
Between 1986 and February 1987, Af­
rican countries transferred, on a net basis, 
three and a half times as much money to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as they 
received in 1985. Further, official lenders 
account for more than three-quarters of the 
debt service due for low-income countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa. Of this, about 20 
percent is due to the IMF and 17 percent to 
other multilateral agencies.
The combined effects of declining export 
earnings, inadequate resource inflows, and 
increasing debt service obligations have 
forced many African countries to cut invest­
ment and import levels, with detrimental 
effects on growth and development. The 
heavy burden of the foreign debt has given 
rise to substantial rescheduling and ac­
cumulation of arrears. Where new loans 
take the form of rescheduling, banks and 
other creditors are in fact lending money to 
themselves. In other words, countries use 
the new money to meet interest payments 
on old loans, which remain active.
Population Pressure, Natural and 
Man-Made Disasters
Africa has a population of more than 500 
million people, which is expected to exceed 
800 million by the end of the century. In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, where the food prob­
lem is most acute, the population will have 
increased from an estimated 350 million in 
1980 to more than 640 million by the year 
2000. With food production and availability 
already chronically deficient, there is no 
likelihood that conditions will improve dra­
matically over the medium term without 
radical changes in a number of areas.
Africa’s population growth is one of the 
highest in the world. It has been accelerat­
ing at about 2.5 percent per annum in 1960 
to about 3-4 percent per annum during the 
1980s. If this rate continues, the current 
population will double in just 22 years. 
Therefore, population control is frequently 
advocated.
The rapid population growth in Africa 
results both from a steady fall in death rates 
and increases in birth rates. By contrast, 
both birth and death rates have been 
declining in other continents, especially in 
the developed world.
Several important factors explain the 
apparent uniqueness of the African situa­
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tion. First, population pressure is integrally 
connected with the nature of the agri­
cultural economy and social institutions. 
Since most Africans make their living from 
the land, child labor is a valuable resource 
for tending food and cash crops, herding 
livestock, and helping with daily chores of 
fetching water and firewood. Having several 
children can be a considerable help to the 
typical rural family. Second, many African 
societies tend to equate large families with 
wealth and power. Third, having many 
children is linked to the traditional role of 
women in society.
In many African countries, women do 
most of the farming and other household 
chores, notwithstanding the cumulative 
physical strain of repeated pregnancies. 
Under the circumstances, women tend to 
want children for economic reasons, and for 
protection and support in their old age. 
Children are also desirable for social rea­
sons, since women’s standing in the family 
and community is closely linked to their 
ability to bear children.
In historical terms, the high birth rates in 
Africa are somewhat related to centuries of 
experience. Such high birth rates have been 
dictated by the absolute necessity to com­
pensate for devastatingly high infant mor­
tality rates, and to replace populations 
regularly decimated by drought and dis­
ease. In this context, it is estimated that of 
the 7 million or so children under the age of 
2 who will die yearly throughout the world, 
about 5 million will be Africans.
Even with the highest population growth 
rate in the world, Africa still remains the 
region with the lowest population density. 
The African continent as a whole contains 
about 20 percent of the world’s cultivable 
land and about 9 percent of its people. Sub- 
Saharan Africa has fewer than 60 people 
per 100 hectares of cultivable land, com­
pared to an average ratio of 180 people per 
100 hectares for all developing countries. 
However, the distribution of arable land 
does not coincide with the distribution of 
the population. This historical disparity has 
been maintained by political borders, tribal 
and linguistic differences, poor internal 
transportation, and endemic diseases, par­
ticularly in the humid and semi-humid 
zones of Central and West Africa.
Population growth is a strategic factor in 
the African food crisis. For one, it imposes 
serious constraints on the amount of food 
that is available. However, its impact should 
be analyzed in terms of the skewed system 
of land distribution in African countries.
While population density in most countries 
remains relatively low, population growth 
continues to improse increasing pressures 
on the available land resources.
One result has been the irreversible 
ecological damage caused by deforestation, 
as people search for new lands on which to 
subsist. Most serious is the loss of soil 
fertility and soil erosion on deforested 
lands. In its extreme form, the loss of soil 
fertility turns land into desert. If that 
occurs on a large scale, it can reduce
The combined effects of 
declining export earnings, 
inadequate resource in­
flows, and increasing debt 
service obligations have 
forced many African coun­
tries to cut investment 
and import levels . . .
rainfall, thereby reinforcing existing tend­
encies toward drought in many parts of 
Africa. Some analysts believe that this 
factor best explains the severity of recent 
droughts in many parts of Africa.
Drought remains one of the primary 
reasons for the African food disaster, and its 
impact cannot be minimized. Many parts of 
Africa are considered areas of marginal 
rainfall so that disruption of rain patterns in 
one year tends to produce a cumulative 
effect, decreasing the ability of the land to 
sustain any kind of prolonged agricultural 
activity. For many consecutive years, rains 
have failed in the corn and grain belts of 
several African countries. This has dras­
tically affected food production, and future 
production is threatened by wind erosion 
and lack of soil regeneration.
Just as it impedes the production of food, 
drought, along with deforestation, has a 
direct impact on another vital resource, 
firewood, which accounts for about 75 
percent of Africa’s energy use. Deforesta­
tion was already a problem before the 
droughts, as demand exceeded the capacity 
of woodlands to replenish themselves.
The cutting and burning of timber has 
contributed significantly to the increased 
desertification of a number of areas. Even 
marginal lands, without trees, are further 
deprived of the means of maintaining and 
building up fragile layers of topsoil. The 
point is that deforestation can contribute to 
drought by influencing water retention and 
evaporation rates.
Finally, many countries in Africa that are 
unable to feed their populations are also 
involved in wars, civil strife, or external or 
internal threats to their stability and secu­
rity. For many years, Ethiopia has been 
involved in military conflict with Somalia, 
and with separatist or autonomist move­
ments in Eritrea and Tigray. This situation 
has created millions of refugees. And young 
men are taken from the already fragile 
agricultural economy to bear arms and 
fight. Farmlands have either become battle 
zones or have been abandoned. The result 
is a simultaneous increase in the demand on 
the food supply and a decrease in the 
capacity for production. Thus, in addition to 
those fleeing drought, another class of 
refugees has been created — those fleeing 
famine and war.
The situation facing the nations of South­
ern Africa also deserves mention. For 
example, Mozambique, one of the countries 
hardest hit by drought and food shortages, 
is at the same time confronted with South 
African-backed guerilla forces that are 
wreaking havoc on the nation’s economy 
and infrastructure. South Africa, which 
supports dissident forces in nations to its 
north, is also involved in the destabilization 
of their economies. Paradoxically, these 
policies work to assure continued economic 
dependency by the frontline states on 
South Africa — as buffers against the 
movement for majority rule in South Af­
rica, as markets for its products, and as 
suppliers of cheap migrant labor for its gold 
mines and industry.
Therefore, the correlation between hun­
ger and military conflict cannot be over­
emphasized. The terrible consequences of 
militarism and fighting, combined with 
cyclical droughts and the negative impact of 
inappropriate development, continue to 
make millions of people vulnerable to hun­
ger and starvation.
Nations involved in military conflict, or 
which face concentrated destabilization, 
end up channeling their already meager 
national resources into building large ar­
mies and massive military hardware. As the 
Ethiopian experience continues to reveal,
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when famine conditions develop, relief 
efforts are complicated by military pri­
orities, instability, and insecurity.
Technology and Food Production 
Systems
The poor food production record in Africa 
is also partly explained by a variety of 
technical factors. While some of these 
factors are specific to the structure of the 
African environment, others reflect contra­
dictions between the food production sys­
tems in the developed and developing world, 
and the lack of appropriate technological 
diffusion between these two sectors.
The technical factors affecting produc­
tion and productivity include: the inade­
quate spread of improved technology, the 
prevalence of pest damage and disease, 
inappropriate and inadequate agricultural 
research, poor agricultural extension pro­
grams, and the lack of infrastructure. In the 
latter context, food availability in Africa has 
suffered not only because of a lag in food 
production, but also because a large part of 
the small amount that is produced never 
reaches the consumers. In many parts of 
the continent, more than one-third of the 
potential harvest of certain crops is wasted 
before harvest (in the harvesting process or 
during the subsequent phases prior to final 
consumption).
Technological progress for improved sta­
ple food crop production has been limited or 
almost non-existent. While hybrid maize 
and other types of technology have been 
introduced in some countries, there have 
been few breakthroughs in breeding im­
proved crop varieties with higher yields. In 
general, the African production environ­
ment is highly inflexible. As a result, it has 
been unable to respond to changing market 
conditions by introducing more productive 
varieties of old crops or new high demand 
ones.
The African food crisis reflects a basic 
contradiction in the global food production 
system. There is enough food in the world. 
Due to scientific and technical advances, 
global food production has tended to out­
pace the unprecedented population growth 
of the past four decades, and for the first 
time more food is being produced than the 
world needs. Enough food is available so 
that countries which do not produce all of 
their food needs can import food if they can 
afford to do so.
These trends should be interpreted from 
the wider perspective of the three agri­
cultural revolutions that the world has 
witnessed, and which have virtually by­
passed the African continent. The first was 
marked by a change from animal to mechan­
ical power during the first four decades of 
the 19th century, and which is still taking 
place in many parts of the developing world. 
The second revolution was linked to the
In order to protect the 
welfare of middle class 
consumers, payments of 
procurement prices to 
farmers have been kept 
low, and below market 
levels.
creation and widespread use of modern 
agricultural inputs—high-yielding varieties 
of seed, fertilizers, pesticides, etc. — after 
the Second World War. The third revolution 
has been based on improved plant genetics. 
The use of a variety of plant breeding 
techniques and genetic engineering have 
helped to produce crops that grow faster, 
are less expensive to plant, and are more 
resistant to harsh weather, pests, and 
diseases.
Politics and the Policies of 
African Governments
A general claim is that African govern­
ments tend to pursue economic and political 
priorities that are at variance with the food 
needs of their populations or the interests of 
subsistence farmers. There is now a consid­
erable debate on the negative effects of 
government intervention on agricultural 
performance and food production. This 
intervention has taken many forms, but the 
policies listed below have received wide­
spread attention.
Many African governments, as a matter 
of deliberate policy, have kept official food 
prices for certain staples generally low, with 
the objective of avoiding civil disturbances 
and ensuring cheap food for the urban 
middle class. On a related basis, govern­
ment marketing agencies and parastatal 
organizations frequently import food and 
sell at a loss.
In order to protect the welfare of middle 
class consumers, payments of procurement 
or producer prices to farmers have been 
kept low, and below market levels. In some 
countries, e.g., Ethiopia, governments 
have for many years forced farmers to sell 
much of their harvested surpluses to the 
state at artificially low prices. In addition, 
peasant farmers are required to deliver a 
state-determined quota of grain to the state 
purchasing agency, which pays at the low 
official rate.
The parastatal organizations have been 
characterized almost everywhere by cor­
ruption, inefficiency, and mismanagement. 
In many cases, their expenses are consider­
ably higher than their revenues from crop 
sales, with the financial losses subsidized by 
the government. The result has been a 
consistent tendency toward nonpayment, 
late payment, or partial payment to farm­
ers. Therefore, farmers have become prone 
to divert their food surpluses to the private 
“parallel” or “black” market, or otherwise 
smuggle their produce to neighboring 
countries where they can obtain higher 
prices.
The currencies of most African coun­
tries have become overvalued. Where a 
currency is overvalued, a hidden tax is 
placed on producers of export crops. It has 
the same disincentive effect on agricultural 
production as when producer prices paid to 
farmers are kept artificially low. It cheapens 
the cost of imported food and therefore sets 
an unfair competition with domestic food 
production. In general, currency over­
valuation provides a hidden subsidy to 
urban consumers at the expense of rural 
dwellers.
In the typical case, currency overvalua­
tion is combined with taxes on agricultural 
exports and import duties and quotas that 
protect manufactured goods produced lo­
cally against competition from imports. 
This has formed an integral part of a 
development strategy known as import 
substitution industralization (I-S).
In the majority of cases, the I-S strat­
egies have required high levels of tariffs for 
new urban-based industries. As a result,
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farmers have been confronted with ex­
tremely high prices for the consumer goods 
and agricultural inputs produced by these 
industries.
The emphasis on import substitution 
industrialization has produced an “urban 
bias” in development policy, as well as 
patterns of agricultural development that 
consistently discriminate against small 
farmers. Such patterns continue to be “bi- 
modal” or dualistic in orientation, in the 
sense that they encourage the development 
of large capital-intensive farm units 
alongside the capital-intensive urban indus­
tries.
The prevalence of “bi-modal” patterns of 
agricultural development is traceable to the 
widespread belief that size and economies 
of scale are important in agriculture. The 
prevalent belief is that only large and fairly 
capital-intensive farm units can be “mod­
ern” and efficient. Not only do many 
government officials in Africa share this 
view, but it also has been vigorously pro­
moted by international lending agencies 
and transnational concerns who have a 
vested interest in the preferential treatment 
of large-scale farms.3
The emphasis on economies of scale has 
also been a persistent tenet in Marxist 
perspectives of agricultural development. 
In both capitalist and socialist-oriented 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, state 
farms have been established because of the 
presumed importance of economies of 
scale, as well as to facilitate the purchase of 
relatively cheap grain and other food staples 
for urban consumers.
The concentration of scarce resources of 
capital, foreign exchange, and trained man­
power in a subsector of relatively large 
mechanized state farms has been achieved 
at the expense of depriving the majority of 
the farm population of inputs and support­
ing services needed to increase food pro­
duction.
A more “uni-modal” pattern of agri­
cultural development should be given top 
priority. This connotes a steady but gradual 
increase in food production and productiv­
ity by the large number of small farmers 
adopting innovations that are appropriate to 
their labor-abundant and capital-scarce en­
vironment.
Policy Changes and Responses
What is clear is that both temporary and 
chronic forms of food insecurity in Sub-
Saharan Africa result from a complex of 
interacting factors — external, internal, 
man-made, natural, and environmental. 
This problem must be addressed on a 
systemic and sustained basis, requiring 
policies and programs based on anticipa­
tion, relief, prevention, and long-term de­
velopment. This sets obligations not only 
for African governments themselves, but 
also for the larger international community.
If technological inputs 
were raised to roughly the 
level. . .  of Latin America 
and Southeast Asia . . .  
Sub-Saharan Africa could 
support nearly six times 
its projected population.
In this context, it can be argued that the 
nature of government policies should be 
accorded primary attention, in the sense 
that they usually set the stage for all forms 
of food insecurity and farmers’ responses to 
the problem.
As a first order of business, African 
governments must put in mechanisms of 
preparedness and relief to stem all forms of 
temporary food insecurity, including fam­
ine. Such measures, for example, early 
warning systems about impending crises, 
can help countries cope with early stages of 
anticipated famine. Over the longer term, 
policy emphasis must shift in the direction 
of prevention by balancing the supply and 
demand for food at higher levels.
In essence, prevention and the attain­
ment of food security depend on the 
possibilities offered for eradicating all forms 
of poverty. This calls for broad-based pro­
grams of agricultural, rural, and national 
development that simultaneously raise per 
capita food output and guarantee owner­
ship rights and exchange entitlements. 
Decisions have to be made about the types 
of economic expansion that would lead to a 
steady rise in real incomes in general, and in
that of the poor and vulnerable groups, in 
particular.
A study by the FAO has investigated the 
potential carrying capacity of the world’s 
farmlands, defined as the number of people 
that the land can feed. The study provides a 
rough indication of the ability of countries 
to feed themselves based on their own food 
production capabilities. Its conclusion is 
that Africa’s land can in theory support 
several times the present population at 
adequate nutritional levels.4
If Sub-Saharan Africa is treated as a unit, 
and if all land with agricultural potential is 
devoted to growing food, and if all techno­
logical inputs remain low, Sub-Saharan 
Africa could support a population at least 
1.6 times larger than its projected popula­
tion in the year 2000. If technological inputs 
were raised to roughly the level used in 
some parts of Latin America and Southeast 
Asia, and if all available land were used 
for food production, Sub-Saharan Africa 
could support nearly she times its projected 
population.
However, the achievement of this option 
would require unprecedented levels of in­
vestment in technology, irrigation, and 
assistance to small farmers. Just to sustain 
the inadequate current levels of nutrition, 
agricultural production in Africa would 
have to grow at a sustained rate above 3 
percent per annum for at least the next 20 
years. Only a few developing countries, 
Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand have 
ever achieved agricultural growth of more 
than 3 percent per year for more than two 
decades.
Even with the most ambitious plans for 
agricultural and national development, Af­
rica would need substantial long-term de­
velopment assistance for many years to 
come. A fundamental aim of such assistance 
should be food self-reliance for the millions 
of Africans who are now dependent on 
imported food. In this context, new pro­
grams of debt relief and international finan­
cial arrangements must be devised to free 
the debtor nations of Africa.
Most official aid to Africa is now condi­
tioned on the requirement that African 
countries practice an export-oriented open 
door policy, rather than take steps to 
increase domestic food self-sufficiency. In 
particular, the World Bank has emphasized 
that Africa’s comparative advantage lies in 
traditional export crops, and therefore that 
it should rely more on free trade policies.5
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